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Abstract 
In understanding styles of political judgement in government decision-making, explanatory 
limitations of rational choice, prospect theoretic, historical institutional, groupthink and other 
approaches suggest that there is space for developing other frameworks. This article argues that 
the neo-Durkheimian institutional theoretical framework deserves serious consideration. It shows 
that it offers a powerful causally explanatory framework for generating theories of decision-making 
in government which can be examined using historical comparative research designs. The value of 
the concept of a ‘thought style’ for understanding political judgement is demonstrated, and 
contrasted sharply with ideology. The theory argues that informal institutions explain thought 
styles. Well-known cases from the Cuban missile crisis, the Wilson and Heath governments 
illustrate the argument. The article rebuts criticisms offered of the neo-Durkheimian institutional 
framework in the literature. Finally, it identifies recent developments and innovations in the 
approach that make it especially suited to explaining political judgement in government decision-
making. 
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Explaining policy decisions in government has been a central puzzle for political science, public 
administration and organisational sociology from these disciplines’ inception. Most approaches 
accept that the contexts in, manners by and constraints under which decisions are made influence 
their content. Yet contention continues about exactly what it is about context, manner and 
constraint that matters most in shaping just which aspects of content of decisions, and by what 
mechanisms. 
 Consider three well-known illustrative puzzles. In October 1962, at the height of the Cuban 
missile crisis, after suggesting in one letter to President Kennedy the possibility of settlement 
without an explicit quid pro quo, Soviet chairman Khrushchev sent a second letter demanding US 
withdrawal of a small number of already obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a condition for 
withdrawing Soviet missiles from Cuba. Of the US missile deployments ringing the USSR about 
which he had sometimes grumbled, Khrushchev had not previously especially singled out the 
Turkish deployment. He and his generals knew the Jupiters’ were of negligible military value and 
that the US would soon introduce submarine-based deployments. Within days, he agreed to drop 
the demand from the publicly announced terms for the withdrawal. Yet the second letter 
prolonged the crisis at one of its most dangerous moments. 
 Such apparent inconsistency in demands strains conventional rational choice explanations 
invoking maximisation of consistent goals. Prospect theoretic arguments (Boettcher, 2005; 
McDermott, 2001; Mercer, 2005) might suggest that Khrushchev was on a losing streak and 
therefore willing to take risks to restore what he considered to be his and the Soviet Union’s 
rightful position. He may well have been in the domain of losses, but this cannot explain the 
apparent swings in his demands, or his particular selection of risks. Indeed, it may predict much 
greater risk-taking than Khrushchev sought to engage in by this stage in the crisis. Ideology is no 
help: Castro’s bitterness against Khrushchev arose precisely because the Soviet leader did not make 
crisis decisions based on revolutionary ideology. Wider ideational explanations (Blyth, 2002; Hall, 
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1993) also fail: Khrushchev’s notion of ‘meniscus’ could be used to justify almost any decision. 
Because he made decisions largely alone, group dynamic accounts have no purchase. 
 Reversing the previous government’s policy, British prime minister Harold Wilson undertook 
a series of both high profile and secret diplomatic initiatives in the mid-1960s with the declared 
aim of seeking conditions for a truce or at least de-escalation in the Vietnam war. They were 
resented by President Johnson, regarded by the Conservative opposition as publicity gimmicks, 
treated by the right-wing press as evidence of Wilson’s alarming closeness to the Soviets, criticised 
by Wilson’s backbenchers as inadequate and compromised by his support for the US war aims, 
and rejected on the same grounds by the North Vietnamese, Soviets and Chinese. None came near 
being successful. Yet from his first weeks in power to as late early 1968, Wilson persisted, especially 
in making approaches to the Soviet leadership. 
 Standard rational choice explanations of Wilson’s decisions are strained, because payoffs were 
low and fell over time. US resentment increased and Labour backbenchers grew steadily more 
rebellious over his Vietnam policy between 1965 to 1968. If personal grandstanding mattered so 
much, then this fact itself requires explanation; it must also be reconciled with Wilson’s series of 
secret approaches to the Soviets. The ‘domain of losses’ argument explains little, because its 
predictions vary widely depending on the reference point Wilson is assumed to have been working 
with. Moreover, it is not obvious why in that domain, Wilson should choose risk-taking over 
Vietnam in 1965 rather than over any other foreign or domestic issue. Conventional historical 
institutionalism explains little, because Wilson followed neither Bevin’s Labour confrontationist 
policy toward the Soviets nor the Foreign Office wisdom that independent peace initiatives merely 
irritated the US. Again, ideology is no help, because Wilson was as committed both to the 
defending the west from communism while pursuing détente as were his predecessors and 
successors. Groupthink (Janis, 1982; ‘t Hart, 1990) will not work, because Wilson’s ministers were 
notoriously divided on the initiatives. 
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 The February 1972 settlement of the first miners’ strike turned into a humiliation for British 
prime minister Edward Heath’s administration. A subsequent Department of Trade and Industry 
‘lessons learned’ report, drawing on a National Coal Board paper, concluded that the fundamental 
problem had been the rigidity of the ‘N minus 1’ pay norm – a policy which ‘could only break, not 
bend’. Heath underlined the phrase in his copy. Yet just eighteen months later, when the second 
confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers was developing, Heath was committed to 
an even more rigid system of statutory pay controls, which again ‘could only break, not bend’. The 
consequence was as humiliating as February 1972. 
 Conventional rational choice struggles to find payoffs worth pursuing in such deepening of 
commitment to a risky, costly strategy already diagnosed within government as likely to fail. 
Alternatively, if being seen to be tough ranked above success in the preference schedule, this itself 
calls for explanation. Historical institutionalist approaches are of limited help, because the 1972 
statutory incomes policy framework was in many ways a major discontinuity which was not yet 
fully institutionalized. Again, risk taking in the domain of losses is no help, because the previous 
experience should have changed the reference point, but did not do so. Invoking biases and 
heuristics provides only superficial understanding. If for example, the availability heuristic is 
invoked, then why was the ‘lessons learned’ report not more readily available than the strategy of 
trying to hold to a pay norm? And why availability rather than any other heuristic? If ideology were 
central, then we should expect the very opposite of what was decided, for in 1972 statutory 
incomes policy was accepted with deep reluctance by the Conservative Party and against its 
ideological preferences. Groupthink explanations fail, because ministers were divided in 1973-4 
and did not form a group: Heath’s individual commitment dominated. 
 This suggests that there is room for another approach to explaining political decision-making, 
which can handle greater complexity in the origins of preferences than standard rational choice, 
provide content where prospect theoretic approaches are under-specified, and explain inabilities 
to ‘learn’ by way of changing stances which have been frustrated by experience. 
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 The next section summarises the main axioms of a fresh approach, using these three examples 
to illustrate their use in explaining political decision-making. Some limitations are recognised in 
some uses of the framework, which have led scholars to be sceptical of its value. Principal 
criticisms of the framework offered in the literature are then briefly answered. The article 
concludes by noting some recent developments in the framework, which should give researchers 
reasons to consider it afresh. 
The neo-Durkheimian institutional framework 
Developed first in anthropology and known by various names, the neo-Durkheimian institutional 
framework’s central explanatory claim is that, by specific causal mechanisms, basic forms of social 
organisation and their combinations and conflicts cultivate particular thought styles (Douglas, 
1986). In government, what matters are structures of social organisation among ministers, senior 
civil servants, advisors and leading officials (cf. Coyle, 2006). Here, thought styles are exhibited as 
styles of political judgement (6, 2004, 2011). 
 Durkheim’s and Mauss’ (1963 [1902-3], 11) thesis was that ‘the classification of things 
reproduces [the] classification of [people]’. That is, we paint our own social organisation onto the 
faces of our problems, opportunities and experiences:, in transposed form, through categories that 
shape our style of thought, we replicate the relations among people with whom we are ordered by 
informal institutions. 
 In the neo-Durkheimian causal account, quotidian ritual practices such as etiquette, deference 
and bonding and assertion, practices for the conduct of meetings or even writing minutes and 
memoranda, reinforce aspects of thought style including key categories, by entraining and eliciting 
styles of thought which give recognition to the positions and relations enacted (Goffman, 1967; 
Collins, 2004; 6, 2011). This quotidian ritual interaction order is much more significant than grand 
public ceremonial as a causal mechanism cultivating thought style (6, forthcoming d). 
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 Informal institutions in their elementary forms are defined, not in the first instance, as rules, 
but as more or less entrenched practices (6, forthcoming d), embodying commitments and which 
specify the positions and relations of social organisation (6, 2011, forthcoming b). By contrast, 
rules are ‘if... then’ statements, or ideas, which may subsequently be formulated in making 
institutions explicit to justify or challenge practices. 
 The framework is based upon Durkheim’s (1951 [1897]; 1961 [1925]) two fundamental 
dimensions of institutional variation in social organisation – namely, social integration and social 
regulation., Respectively, these are the degree to which practices, positions and relations are 
specified by strong or weak accountability to bonds and membership, and by strong or weak 
accountability to constraint, imperative, prescription, roles and given fact. Cross-tabulating these 
dimensions and attending to the forms generated in the cells (Douglas 1970, 1982 [1978]) (rather 
than focusing on the apices, as Durkheim did in Suicide) yields the four ‘elementary forms’ 
(Durkheim 1995 [1912]) of social organisation. These can be observed in differently weighted 
hybrids among humans generally, including among policy-makers in governments (6, forthcoming 
b). These institutional orderings are hierarchical (strong regulation and integration), individualistic 
(weak regulation and integration), isolate (strong external regulation, weak integration) and 
enclaved (strong integration, weak external regulation – that is, only enough internally generated 
regulation to sustain strong integration in the absence of external authority or power: Rayner, 1988) 
(Douglas 1982 [1978]). It follows that ‘hierarchy’ is understood, not as command or domination 
or any kind of inequality, but, using the anthropological definition, as common membership in a 
community, albeit among unequals (Dumont, 1980). Thus, subalterns have discrete and respected 
roles while superiors are also constrained by rules, roles and regulated practices. Coordination in 
hierarchy therefore cannot simply rest upon command or coercion (as it must in isolate contexts), 
but on legitimate authority. 
 Isolate ordering need not only take a passive, downtrodden position, known as that of the 
‘structural serf’. Unable to use bonds, authority, incentive or appeal to shared principle, a heavily 
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constrained and weakly integrated figure in high office faces huge challenges in sustaining that 
office, when constraints threaten to impose losses. Deductively, the theory predicts that the 
strategy most likely to be pursued is that of attempting to pass on constraints to others, by 
imposing them. This is the position of the structural despot (this usage is related to Durkheim’s 
own (1984 [1897], 143-4; 1961 [1925], 44-5), account of despotism: but its current positioning in 
isolate ordering was first argued by Coyle, 1994; cf. 6, 2011). When passing on constraints by 
imposition fails, a despotic figure can only accept and absorb losses while trying to survive by 
coping (rather than, say, dying in the proverbial ditch, as those whose strong integration is 
sustained by shared principle might). Thereby, the isolate moves from the structurally despotic to 
the structural serf position. There is now evidence supporting the prediction (6, 2012, forthcoming 
a). 
 6 (2013, forthcoming a) presents a scheme of categorical operationalisation for these 
elementary forms, based on positions, relations and their valences. These provide measures of 
social organisation which are fully independent of those for the explanandum of thought style. 
 In the first example, the Kremlin in the early 1960s was characterised by a hybrid form in 
which isolate organisation was especially important, the chairman himself occupying the structural 
position of an isolate despot (6, 2011). The two Wilson governments of the 1960s were, for most 
of their six years, highly individualistically ordered (6, forthcoming a, d; contra Bale, 1999), around 
a small number of ambitious, fiercely rival patrons and their claques of clients. Heath’s 
administration initially exhibited an unstable hybrid of hierarchical and isolate ordering, but 
Heath’s own position became increasingly dominant and isolated from his colleagues. 
 The framework’s explanandum is the thought style exhibited by policy-makers. A thought style 
is defined as 
 
(i) a consistent pattern of constraints upon reasoning toward decision-making, shown over a 
series of decisions, 
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(ii) which frames appreciation of problems for decision and options available, and 
(iii)  which leads to weighting of imperatives, but  
(iv) where considerations concern formal rather than substantive features of decisions, and  
(v) where the constraints and frames are independent of the decision-makers substantive 
political ideals and of the particular topics decided upon. 
 
 Style therefore captures key cognitive and affective forces influencing decisions. Propositions 
may be believed with greater or less dogmatism. Emotions may be felt about conditions described 
in propositions, with greater or less complexity and ambiguity. Categories may be used in 
propositions and their boundaries may be marked with greater or less rigidity or insistence, and 
with greater or less exaggeration of differences between cases within and beyond a category. This 
allows for more or for less negotiation, trade-off, hybridity, etc. Aims and intentions may be 
pursued more or less tolerantly of compromise. Options may be assessed with greater or less 
attention to their relationship with past choices or with future hopes and fears. Preferences may 
be more or less sequentially ordered. Style is therefore not contrasted with content, as if it were 
empty: rather, its content is formal rather than substantive. 
 Thought style varies independently of ideology. An ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs 
that, if made explicit, would consist in normative propositions about substantive, long term, 
general goals for a political system, expressing the relative importance of such aims as equality, 
personal or civic liberty, tolerance, private property rights, social protection, distributive justice, 
mutuality, obedience and authority. Thought style describes how a policy-maker uses their ideology 
in making particular decisions, not what their ideology is. There can be enclaved groups of liberals 
and of monetarists too, while social democrats can exhibit strongly individualistic organisation and 
thought style in some governments and periods and altogether more hierarchical ordering in 
others. For example, during the missile crisis, President Kennedy and his chiefs of staff were at 
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loggerheads, not about the ideological merits of confronting communism in the name of 
democratic capitalism, but on the basis of contrasting thought styles (6, 2011). 
 Although Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) had cast the neo-Durkheimian theory using ideology 
as the explanandum, Douglas herself recognised the difficulties raised by, for example, enclaving 
among ideologically conservative groups (as Durkheim 1915 himself had stressed) and 
individualistic organisation in left-leaning political circles. Her later (1986) account, therefore, 
provided fresh micro-foundations showing that the theory performs better in explaining thought 
style. The present argument provides a sharper, clearer distinction between thought style and 
worldview than Douglas herself did, even in How institutions think, by focusing exclusively on 
stylistic features of the framing of decisions. 
 Durkheim’s and Mauss’ (1963, 11) dictum can now be restated. Thought styles will exhibit 
cognitive relations among categories, etc which are as tightly or as loosely integrated and regulated 
as the informal institutions among policy-makers lead them to be strongly or weakly socially 
integrated and regulated. Tightness or looseness of social organisation among people is exhibited 
in the cognitive organisation of relations exhibited, for example, in decision-making between 
reasons and decisions, preferences in a schedule, issues linked, continuity or lack of it over time. 
Mixes of forms of social organisation cultivate these thought styles through practices of 
undermining and reinforcement – specifically, negative rites of blame, accusation, disapprobation, 
and positive rites of assertion, commitment, deference etc (Goffman, 1967; 6, forthcoming d). 
 In researching governments’ political judgement, style is operationalised using the following 
measures of (6, 2011, 87-99, forthcoming a) 
- the manner in which information is set aside, ignored, rejected when there is more 
information available than attention for it (6, 2004); 
- strategy under uncertainty; 
- treatment of particular empirical constraints; 
  11 
- response to anomalies in categories used (e.g., surprises, unexpected outcomes) (6, 2013; 
cf. Douglas, 1966; Thompson 1982); 
- structure and consistency of preference schedules, which provides either for commitment 
or for flexibility in strategy; 
- risk stance in the domains of losses and gains (which are predicted to show greater variation 
than prospect theory allows); 
- stance toward time (anticipation and planning horizons, reference to collective memory) 
(Rayner, 1982, Peck and 6, 2006, 50-77); 
- relations among reasons, goals and preferences; and 
- use of, degree of, and justification for issue linkage. 
 In isolate ordering, the framework predicts attempts to debar anomalies and then – if and 
when these fail – their acceptance, loose relations among reasons and goals and preferences, and 
opportunistic coping behaviour. A structural despot faces strong constraint in establishing the 
credibility of threat she or he (perhaps implicitly) makes to sanction others for violating constraints 
imposed or passed on, but their weak integration limits their capability and therefore that 
credibility. Likewise, these constraints limit the scope for learning of a kind that allows for variation 
in fundamental strategy. Thus Khrushchev reached opportunistically for a claim which was weakly 
integrated into his scheme of preferences. Belatedly raising the Turkish deployment after offering 
to settle without additional conditions, and then agreeing to withdraw without any public 
concession from the US, all exhibit precisely the stance toward anomaly, attempted imposition and 
then loss acceptance that we expect in improvising and coping under strong constraint. Indeed, 
Khrushchev told his son that he was belatedly ‘looking around’ for any concession that could be 
extorted before withdrawing. Although Heath’s programme for government was explicitly 
founded upon a commitment to greater hierarchy, increasing isolate ordering among ministers 
meant that pursuing greater social regulation only served to reinforce isolate judgement styles of 
constraint imposition (6, forthcoming a). Heath’s repeated attempts to insist on passing on macro-
  12 
economic constraints in micro-economic incomes policy proved structurally brittle and debarring 
of anomalies, only to be followed by enforced acceptance. 
 In individualistic ordering, by contrast, we expect relations between reasons and goals to be 
weakly integrated. Weaker constraints will allow action oriented to the medium term, where 
negotiation among independents and appeals to dependent followers can sustain commitment. 
The framework predicts that people will choose to bear those risks which place least strain on or 
ritually enact their social organisation. Thus, in individualistic ordering, personal bilateral 
negotiations will be pursued to further or at least limit damage to the individual’s standing. Wilson, 
for example, may have been (but after a difficult phone call in early 1965 probably was not) deluded 
about his standing with Johnson. He was certainly not deluded about the contribution that his 
attempts in superpower diplomacy made to his standing with voters who expected Britain to play 
a global role, and with his status vis-à-vis his Commonwealth counterparts, his ‘crown princes’ and 
relations with his own client ministers in the individualistically ordered government. The 1965 
Commonwealth mission served a tactical purpose in fending off personal criticism at that year’s 
Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference. 
 Under individualistic institutions, a weakly integrated but flexible preparation for possible 
setback and adversity can be sustained. People will cultivate ‘reserve preferences’ or motivations 
for undertaking the risky course which might be achievable even if the substantive or avowed goal 
fails. This need not be a gimmick or stunt (accusations levelled against Wilson), because the 
avowed goal may well have been an entirely sincere hope. Wilson may well privately not have held 
out much hope for the 1965 Commonwealth mission but he seems sincerely to have believed that 
the February 1967 London talks with Kosygin offered a serious chance. Yet he was careful to 
ensure that when the matter of the talks eventually leaked, it could be presented in a way that could 
seek credit for effort – the reserve preference. As expected in individualistic ordering, anomalies 
among Britain’s positions as co-chair of the Geneva process, a loyal member of the western 
alliance, and as broker, were to be exploited, neither controlled by adjustment nor simply accepted. 
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 Elementary forms of social organisation are subject to self-reinforcing positive and 
countervailing negative feedback dynamics (Thompson, 1982, 1992, 2008; 6, 2003), which explain 
patterns of change over time. Under institutions of each form, thought styles are cultivated which 
lead people to make decisions which reinforce those institutions. Thereby, over time, people assert 
the application of those institutions over wider empirical areas of activity and exaggerate them. 
Contrary to the fashionable contemporary wisdom (Pierson, 2004; Arthur, 1994) that positive 
feedback brings about increasing returns and greater stability, Durkheim showed that, taken far 
enough in pure elementary forms, it can lead to self-disorganisation (1984 [1893], Bk III; 1951 
[1897], passim; 1961 [1925], 44-5). Figure One shows the general structure of the framework’s 
causal explanation. 
<Figure One here> 
 This helps us to understand the appearance of inability to ‘learn’ in cases such as Heath’s. In 
his administration, isolate ordering became more pronounced, especially after Maudling resigned 
under a cloud and Whitelaw departed for Belfast. As Heath reacted to the industrial setbacks of 
1972 by withdrawal and centralisation of decision-making in Number 10, ministerial cohesion 
declined, and his structural despotic position grew more marked. The deepening isolation ordering 
within the government provides the best explanation for the government’s increasing tendency to 
use regulation to impose constraints on trades unions and businesses and, when that failed (as it 
did with the miners in 1972 and 1973-4, with the trades union movement over the Industrial 
Relations Act by late summer 1972, and with price control on business in autumn 1973), to accept 
loss but without resilience. 6 (forthcoming a, 2012) uses a causal process analytic approach to show 
that both the chronology of deepening isolate ordering and growing imperative style with blocked 
learning in decision-making and the evidence of positive feedback within policy fields provide a 
richer explanation for the case than conventional contextual, rational or groupthink ones. 
 Thought styles in each form lead people to react against styles of thought and organisation 
exhibited in other elementary forms, when they encounter them. This countervailing force creates 
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negative feedback, which can either sustain conflict and gridlock or may simply produce mutually 
checking and a kind of fragile equilibrium. 
 Structural isolate despotic governments are especially likely to face sharp negative feedback 
when seeking to impose constraints on other actors who are not themselves organised as structural 
serfs. This is shown by Khrushchev’s experience when the US discovered the missiles in Cuba and 
by the Heath government’s experience of the trades union movement’s response to the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act and that of the miners to that government’s attempt to enforce successive 
incomes policy limits. Isolate ordering affords less capacity than is sustained in individualistic 
ordering for finding face-saving accommodations in deep adversity, which preserve the 
government in some order to fight future conflicts on fresh terrain. This makes the contrast 
entirely intelligible between Wilson’s acceptance of the TUC’s ‘solemn and binding undertaking’ 
in 1969 from which his government recovered its poise by the time of the election, and Heath’s 
government’s failure to recover its poise after humiliating setbacks in the first miners’ strike and 
the failure of the Industrial Relations Act in the rail and dock strikes of 1972 and Heath’s and 
Barber’s refusal to accept the TUC offer of a face-saving formula in 1974. 
 Because pure forms tend to disorganisation in positive feedback, hybrid forms are solutions 
commonly observed (6, 2003; Thompson et al, 1990). Hybrids are produced when positive 
feedback leading to disorganisation in one form creates problems and difficulties for people, who 
are then forced to develop solutions which articulate other kinds of institutions. They can only 
reach for institutions of one or more of the other three forms. Doing so creates negative feedback, 
which may be homeostatic (Hood, 1996), until disrupted by other positive feedback processes. For 
example, (other than in revolutionary periods or in failed states) a functioning civil service and a 
system of constitutional law sustain important strands of hierarchy in governing systems. 
Hierarchy too can be subject to positive feedback, when rules and roles proliferate to the point of 
baroque illegibility, undermining the very goals of rule-based trust in systems for which these 
hierarchical institutions were developed. In these conditions, people look to other ways of 
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organising for solutions. These might, for example, encompass tolerating greater individual 
discretion. Using discretion to tempering hierarchy might sustain a form of organisation in which 
an uneasy coalition between the two forms in conflictual mutual dependence can be maintained 
for some time, with each checking some of the other’s excesses (Hood, 1996). 
 These dynamics can produce complicated outcomes. For example, where policy-makers are 
organised in hybrids in which hierarchical and isolate ordering prevail, positive feedback in their 
common institutional commitment to greater social regulation may be intended by policy-makers 
to sustain hierarchy but may reinforce isolate ordering (6, 2012, forthcoming a). This is one 
important pathway into an ‘isolation dynamic’, or a shift toward greater articulation of isolate 
ordering within the mix in government. It proved to be critical in the case of Heath’s 
administration. However, informal institutions in the Kremlin in Khrushchev’s period took a 
different path into their isolation dynamic (6, 2011). 
Overcoming limitations in common uses of the framework; answering 
criticisms 
The presentation of the framework given above resolves many difficulties that have led some 
political scientists to be sceptical of its merits. 
 That social organisation explains bias is sufficiently non-obvious and distal to provide 
satisfying explanations. Instead of looking inductively for particular biases and aggregating them 
to retrofit explanations to particular decisions, a deductive approach can be taken. Those aspects 
of preferences which fall within the boundaries of style can be explained endogenously, thus 
capturing the deeper importance of institutions in preference formation than is recognised by the 
many shallow forms of endogeneity used in mainstream rational choice approaches. By explaining 
limits to available variation in perceptions of interests on a wide variety of dimensions of decision-
making, theories based on the framework can decisively undermine the implausible postmodernist 
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claim that thought floats freely from social structure or that it is indefinitely various even in its 
elementary forms, while avoiding the risks of taking either interests or ideas as simply given. 
 Using Durkheim’s terms ‘social regulation’ and ‘social integration’ provides precision, clarifies 
the theory’s roots and avoids the terms, ‘grid’ and ‘group’, which some scholars have found 
obscure or trivialising. 
 The framework’s institutional character is clear: ideas are explained by informal institutions of 
social organisation, while positions and relations provide proxy operational measures for 
elementary institutions. Rather than invoking the vague term, ‘culture’ (cf. Kuper, 1999), this 
account uses precise terms for the explanatory factors of elementary forms of social organisation 
and the explanandum of thought style, thereby emphasising that the neo-Durkheimian approach is 
a causal theory, not merely a typology. 
 One limitation of using worldviews, rather than social organisation, as the explanatory basis 
(as Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, did) is that this reduces the argument to explaining particular 
ideas (e.g., about decisions) by general ones (e.g., about grand political ideals). Yet even if 
policymakers have clear worldviews, it is possible that those worldviews may be ex post 
rationalisations of particular decisions. Mere consistency between general and particular ideas does 
not explain the particular ones. Nor does it help to make worldviews the explanandum, because, as 
we have seen, many ideologies can be sustained in different informal institutional orderings. By 
shifting focus to thought style (Douglas, 1986), and by defining thought style sharply independently 
of substantive normative outlooks, the framework gains empirical content and explanatory power, 
especially for cases of conflict among people claiming to espouse similar ideologies.  
 Identifying both cross-sectional causal mechanisms of quotidian interaction ritual, including 
those articulated in written communications within government, and longitudinal causal processes 
of positive and negative feedback, shows that the charge (e.g., Bellaby, 1989) is incorrect, that the 
framework is descriptive and static. 
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 Emphasising the causal relation brings out the methodological importance of using 
independent measures for social organisation among policy makers, based on informal position 
and relations (6, forthcoming b), and for the thought styles exhibited in their decisions (Douglas, 
1982 [1978]; 1986; 6, 2011). The previous section has identified some principal measures used in 
explaining political decision-making. Examining particular theories derived from the framework 
empirically is rather demanding, because one must measure social organisation and thought style 
separately for the same group of policy-makers and test for expected consonance between them 
over time, ideally avoiding common source bias. Using a single set of undifferentiated measures 
(e.g., of ‘culture’) means that the framework can only be used descriptively to identify the presence 
and relative weight of elementary forms. The explanatory force of the approach is lost, and the 
impression is given that the framework consists only in its typology. 
 Too often, studies are conducted on the explananda of thought style and the very risky inference 
is made back to the explanatory factors of social organisation – that, for example, what appears to 
be evidence of enclaved thought style must be explained by enclaved organisation. This inference 
is liable to error. In some conditions of unequal hybridity or conflict of institutional forms, people 
may resort to ‘stolen’ (Thompson et al, 1990) or ‘borrowed’ (6, forthcoming d) rhetoric to justify 
their commitments in terms that achieve acquiescence from people who operate under different 
ordering. Moreover, appearances on the explanandum alone can mislead. For example, evidence of 
judgement style showing a tendency to insist upon something with great determination and to seek 
to suppress recognition of anomalies may not be evidence of deep enclaving. It could be – as was 
the case of Heath’s government – the fragile strategy pursued by those in structurally despotic 
positions in isolate ordering, seeking to pass on constraints. Only a longitudinal account of what 
fallback options, if any, are considered when such an imposition and anomaly-barring strategy fails 
could reveal the difference. Unfortunately, cross-sectional studies are commonly undertaken to 
examine theories derived from the neo-Durkheimian institutional approach, when only 
longitudinal research can examine hypotheses about interplay among feedback dynamics. It is very 
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difficult confidently to assess the relative weighting of elementary forms in hybrid institutional 
organisation in cross-sectional analysis, when one cannot examine the trajectories of assertion, 
counter-assertion and changes in response to erosion over time in the patterns of institutional 
conflictual dependency. 
 For various reasons, many political scientists have rejected the neo-Durkheimian institutional 
framework as a candidate for successful explanation of governmental decision-making. The 
remainder of this section offers brief rebuttals for common criticisms (cf. 6, 2011; 6 and Mars, 
2008). 
 A criticism sometimes made in conversation, but not in print, is that the framework does not 
address mainstream questions in political science. This article shows that this is misconceived. Few 
puzzles are closer to the centre of the discipline than the need to explain governmental decision-
making. Moreover, in showing how thought style is explained by social organisation, and is 
independent of ideology, the argument makes an important contribution to the debate about the 
importance of ideas in politics. Most scholars advocating ideational explanation focus exclusively 
on ideological beliefs (Béland and Cox, 2011). This article shows that other aspects of ‘ideas’ – 
namely, those which constitute thought styles – matter greatly for explaining decisions but they 
are not causally fundamental. 
 The present argument shows that Sabatier’s (1999, 11) charge no longer stands, that the 
framework’s concepts are too ambiguous, its links with institutions insufficiently clear for it to be 
taken seriously as an account of the policy-making process. 
 The illustrations above show that the framework generates testable hypotheses which show 
powerful goodness of fit and rich causality while preserving parsimony and generality. For 
example, using such case studies as those of Khrushchev and Heath, the theory explains why 
isolates in high office will seek to pass on constraints by imposition, and when they fail, will absorb 
losses and cope but with reduced resilience, whereas the flexible preference ordering afforded in 
individualistic thought styles allows for richer sets of fallback options and even for reserve 
  19 
preferences, which sustain greater resilience to adversity. Again, for example, the discussion of 
Wilson’s decision-making shows that the framework can generate testable hypotheses about the 
selection of risks borne, where prospect theory can at most say that some risk or other might be 
run. 
 The charge that the typology is ‘simplistic’ has been levelled more than once (see e.g., Marsh 
et al, 2001, 17). As Hood (1998) pointed out, most approaches in fact use fewer than four basic 
forms. Currently fashionable institutional theories often use just three – namely, markets, 
hierarchies and ‘networks’ (e.g., Thompson et al, 1991; Bouckaert et al, 2010). Moreover, the 
category of a ‘network’ is not a single elementary form (6 et al, 2006). Ironically, some critics 
complain that four is too many elementary forms for the theory to be integrated (Alexander and 
Smith, 1996). Both criticisms mistake the framework for its typology. Rather, the causal engine 
beneath the typological bonnet provides both theoretical unity and models for interactions among 
forms. 
 The truth that there is an indefinite variety of ‘ways of life’ (Marsh et al, 2001, 17; Renn, 1992) 
misses the point. The framework identifies a limited plurality of elementary, not of empirical forms. 
Satisfying explanations must trade off generality, causality, parsimony and goodness of fit 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970; 6 and Bellamy, 2012). Simply describing indefinite variation in 
empirical forms may provide goodness of fit, but cannot meet these other standards. Marsh et al 
(2001, 17) claim that the framework identifies forms ‘but not much else’. The presentation of the 
causal relation and summary of the feedback dynamics above shows that this is incorrect.  
 Indeed, as Marsh et al (2001, 18) say, people are not fixed in any one form for their whole lives. 
But the framework itself offers clear and testable explanations for the shifts they make, in response 
to feedback dynamics and the adversities and anomalies they generate. 
 Marsh et al go on to suggest that the theory is circular, because coding for elementary forms 
requires the ascription of motives. Again, this is a misunderstanding. Application of codes for 
elementary forms rests on multiple predicates for social organisation, measured by position and 
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relation only, not on any aspect of thought or motivation (6, forthcoming b). The unit of analysis 
is that of social organisation, not the individual. 
 Sjöberg (1997) made much of the point that elementary forms are not found in pure states. 
This is true, but the framework offers both explanations for this fact, and a method for measuring 
relative weights in mixes and hybrid settlements. 
 Douglas (1986) refuted Elster’s exaggerated (1983) claim that all functional explanations are 
either invalid or viciously circular by showing that the functional loops are ones of positive and 
negative feedback. Today, it is widely recognised that functional explanations are invaluable in 
social science (Kincaid, 1990, 1996); even rational choice theorists now accommodate them (Pettit, 
2000). 
 The old charge against Durkheimian theories that they posit ‘group minds’ will not stand. 
Douglas’ (1986) formulation resting on institutions, and the redefinition of informal institutions 
as practices (6, 2011, forthcoming d) was introduced precisely to avoid any routine attribution of 
intentions of the kind that would be required for a ‘group mind’. On the other hand, in the special 
case of strongly integrated and weakly externally regulated groups held together in the absence of 
authority or power, only by shared commitment to beliefs of a principled character (the nearest 
thing that social organisation could offer to a ‘group mind’), the framework explains both their 
possibility and their fragility, as a result of in positive feedback and vulnerability to exhaustion or 
schism (Douglas and Mars, 2003). 
 The complaint that neo-Durkheimian account of social organisation obscures agency, is also 
misguided. The framework is therefore not methodologically individualistic, but this feature 
positively enables it to provide a rich and subtle account of the varieties of forms of agency, 
described in substantive terms. This is because each elementary form’s thought style describes a 
style of agency. Thus, ‘[i]n [substantively] individualistic contexts, agency is instrumental, strategic, 
medium-term; in enclaved ones, principled, under foreshortened planning horizons; in hierarchical 
ones, rule- and authorisation-based; in isolate ones, coping, improvisatory, opportunistic’ (6, 2011, 
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282; forthcoming c; cf. Douglas and Ney, 1998). By contrast, as Hay (2004) has argued, agency in 
many methodologically individualistic frameworks is really only a relative absence of constraint, 
lacking semantic content of its own. Empirically, this account performs well in understanding 
contrasting styles of agency cultivated among policy-makers in the administrations led by 
Khrushchev and Castro, Wilson and Heath. 
 Endogenous production of conflict by negative feedback shows that, even though the 
framework uses functional explanations defined by causal feedback loops, the argument directly 
contradicts functionalist theory’s expectation of a default of equilibrium. It makes use neither of a 
notion of ‘society’ (an ill-bounded concept), nor of social organisation possessing ‘needs’ nor of 
any automatic process by which any such supposed ‘needs’ might be met. 
 If a social science framework is judged by its fertility in generating new hypotheses which are 
not merely ad hoc ways of saving data but which generate fresh predictions which prove to be 
empirically well-founded (Lakatos, 1970), then the neo-Durkheimian approach must be regarded 
as ‘progressive’. In political science, influential empirical studies reporting support for theories 
from the framework include Coyle and Ellis (1994) and Verweij and Thompson (2006), Verweij 
(2011), Stoker’s (2002) work on the Blair government, Lodge’s (2011) study on regulation, 
Grendstad’s work on citizens’ political attitudes (e.g., 2000, 2001, 2003a,b; Grendstad and 
Sundback, 2003), Richards’ (1996, 1999; Archibald and Richards, 2002) studies on enclaves in the 
Sierra Leone civil wars of the 1990s, Maesschalck’s (2004) work on administrative ethics, Bale’s 
(e.g., 1997, 1999) work on the British Labour party, Coughlin and Lockhart’s (1998) examination 
of political culture, Hendriks’ (1999) comparison between Münich’s and Birmingham’s transport 
policies and Verweij’s (2000) study on the management of international rivers and lakes; see also 
studies in a special issue of PS: Political science and politics, 2011, 44, 4, 703-748. Using various 
methods, data types and analytic techniques, these studies have shown the distinctness of the 
elementary forms, the robustness of the core association and the explanatory power of the thesis 
of shaping of thought style by informal institutions and practices. These studies also use slightly 
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different measures or codes of thought style, ranging from policy preferences (e.g., Hendriks, 
Stoker, Bale), through political attitudes and especially attitudes toward political risks (Grendstad, 
Coughlin and Lockhart) to the willingness to act in particular ways in specific organisational 
contexts (Hood, Richards, Maesschalck). 
Recent developments in the framework 
Much remains to be done to develop the neo-Durkheimian institutional framework. Although 
extensive and growing, the empirical literature is still less mature than one might hope. Geometric 
and diagrammatic representations have been produced to describe the framework’s non-linear 
dynamics of positive and negative feedback (6, 2006). Yet no one has written a full set of structural 
equations from which precise models of these dynamic trajectories can be generated and specified. 
There remain outstanding theoretical problems. For example, the issue remains unresolved, 
whether the dimensions of social regulation and social integration should be understood as ones 
taking binary values or else as continuously differentiable. 
 Nonetheless, the framework has recently been developed significantly and some resources in 
its source formulations have been recovered, in ways that increase its explanatory power in 
understanding policy-making processes. 
 As shown above, richer understanding has been developed of the peculiarities of isolate 
ordering, especially by clarifying the structurally despotic position and its peculiar problems and 
vulnerabilities. In the same register of identifying the range of positions and relations within 
elementary forms, the potential for individualistic organisation has become better understood as 
the role of individualistic patron-client forms has been distinguished, in which claques of 
supporters are sustained by general exchange rather than the specific exchange associated with 
bargaining and explicit negotiation (6, 2011, forthcoming a). Crude conceptions of the elementary 
forms as being associated, respectively, exclusively with rigid systems of command, unfettered 
bargaining, extremism and with passive, downtrodden coping, have been replaced with a richer set 
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of available strategies possible in particular positions and relations within these orderings. The 
recent developments in providing fuller accounts of positions and relations within elementary 
forms provide better trade-offs between parsimony and goodness of fit. 
 Recent work has enriched the framework’s understanding of causation, both cross-sectionally 
and longitudinally. Quotidian ritual cultivation, elicitation and entrainment of thought style is 
central to the framework’s causal theory (6, 2007, 2011, forthcoming d). The framework’s origins 
lie in analysis of differences in ways in which people treat things which are anomalous within their 
systems of lay classification (Douglas, 1966; 6, 2013). Thompson et al (1990) argued that surprises, 
as one kind of anomaly, can be important points in feedback dynamics occasioning institutional 
change. New work is examining empirically the hypothesis that anomalies in political classification 
among policy-makers can contribute to trajectories of positive and negative feedback (6, 2013). 
The appearance of salient anomalies can lead to significant changes, by way either of positive or 
of negative feedback, in policy-makers’ institutional organisation, thus supporting the second 
phase of the functional feedback loop back from judgement style upon the organisation of the 
policy-makers (6, 2006; forthcoming a). In this way, cross-sectional micro-foundations and 
longitudinal trajectories of institutional change are synthesised in a fuller account of the causal 
engine than was previously available. 
 Moreover, the neo-Durkheimian institutional framework can synthesise insights from many 
other approaches. It explains as substantively individualistic cases, those contexts in which people 
will adopt future-anchored reference points, and as strongly integrated ones, those settings where 
people will adopt heavily past-anchored ones. The framework thereby provides content for 
schematic approaches such as prospect theory, by explaining just which risks and which losses will 
matter in settings where policy-makers cannot be averse, neutral or loving to all risks or losses: 
thus, it shows how and why the gradient of that theory’s ‘S’ curve differs among the elementary 
forms.  Some advocacy coalitions may each be – for example – enclaved, but many sustain 
individualistic ordering among leaders which structures competition. Each elementary form 
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supplies a distinct time discounting style, which in turn stylises choice; in strongly integrated 
contexts, appeal to old historical analogies is more likely than in weakly integrated ones; and so on.  
 In providing a richer account of isolate ordering, the framework enables a more satisfying 
explanation of when such heuristics as availability might trump other potentially salient heuristics 
among policy-makers. The framework offers a rich account of full range of institutions which 
influence political judgement, and of the depth of their shaping, not only of preferences but even 
of styles of rationality (including the completeness and consistency of preference schedules). In 
these ways, it offers solutions to some of the difficulties that rational choice and game theory run 
into, in the proliferation of equilibria and the inadequacy of those traditions’ means for accounting 
for endogeneity of cognitive and affective factors shaping choice (6, 2011).  
 Janis’ (1982) groupthink theory specified insulation and partiality in decision-making groups 
under external stress, leading to concurrence-seeking. This described one condition of small 
groups under enclaving well, but lacked the clear neo-Durkheimian account of informal 
institutions supplying groups’ boundaries and forms of insulation. It also lacked positive and 
negative feedback dynamics to explain change over time. ‘t Hart (1990) extended the account to 
bring in ‘closed’ leadership. But this lacked the all-important distinction between individualistic 
patronal (e.g., Wilson in the 1960s), isolate despotic (Khrushchev in 1962; Heath in 1972-3), 
enclaved charismatic and hierarchical rule- and authority-based institutional styles of leadership. ‘t 
Hart’s account of ‘closed’ leadership focuses on aspects of thought style which really belong on 
the explanandum of concurrence. Other group dynamic models have been proposed as extensions 
of groupthink yet actually abandon its commitment to informal group dynamics as explanatory 
forces. Thus, Preston (1997) abandons collective processes to assert leaders’ preferences as given. 
Hoyt and Garrison (1997) too abandon group process, returning to interests but without 
explaining whence particular interests arise or how they are selected. Janis’ original model showed 
preferences and interests to be endogenous, and the neo-Durkheimian framework provides a more 
precise account of institutional endogeneity of selection among interests. Stern’s (1997) ‘newgroup’ 
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account likewise really describes kinds of individualistic or of isolate ordering at an early stage in 
the lifecycle of a decision-making body, but again this theory lacks the neo-Durkheimian 
institutional specificity, and is anyway inapplicable in the three cases examined. The principal 
‘extensions’ of the groupthink model therefore either identify hybrid forms between enclaved 
concurrence and other elementary forms but lack clear accounts of institutional variation, or else, 
far from extending the model, effectively abandon group dynamics by taking preferences or 
interests as given. 
 Because the neo-Durkheimian institutional framework offers a substantive account of what 
‘contexts’ consist in, how they change and what their causal roles are, it contributes significantly 
to the central puzzle of understanding how the way in which policy is made in turn shapes its 
substance. Researchers interested in policy-making processes and in political judgement have 
reasons to look afresh at the approach. 
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